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The Role of the Black Market in China's
International Financial System
I. INTRODUCTION
In a joint communiqu6 simultaneously issued in Beijing and Wash-
ington, D.C. on December 15, 1978,1 President Jimmy Carter announced
the United States' diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of
China ("China" or "PRC") after nearly thirty years of nonrecognition.
In the eight years which have elapsed since the normalization of rela-
tions, cultural, economic, and political ties between China and the
United States have continued to improve. The United States and the rest
of the occidental world represent China's primary source of hard cur-
rency required to finance its plans of industrialization. To encourage the
inflow of these foreign assets, China has opened its doors to foreign inves-
tors, foreign traders, and foreign tourists.
The problems which China suffers in its attempt to industrialize are
not dissimilar to those experienced by other developing nations. The
government must weigh its desire to maintain centralized control of the
economy against its need to bring foreigners and foreign currency into
the country. The Chinese have recognized this problem, noting that
"whenever the government tries to increase its control of the economy,
rigidity results, and when restrictions are eased, confusion reigns."2
Understanding the extent of China's problems of industrialization
requires a knowledge of the character of the country. As Frank Ching, a
China observer for the Wall Street Journal commented:
Part of the problem is China's size. No other government in history has
had to look after one billion people. In a way, running China is like carry-
ing a tray brimming with water: a rapid movement makes the water spill,
steady hands and small steps are required. But the desire not to go too far
too fast has given Chinese policy a zigzag character. Each new plan cries
out for modification after a while, giving the impression of a country that
takes one step backward for each step forward.3
The Chinese government thus attempts to forge a steady growth course
I See The Joint Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 274 (1979).
2 Ching, China Attempts to Steer a Steady Course But Policy Reversals Seem to be the Norm,
Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1983, at 34, col. 1.
3 Id.
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for its economy, burdened by seemingly insurmountable problems. The
government's desire to maintain control without hampering economic
growth, coupled with China's size and underdevelopment, has created
many flaws in the system which the government is unable or unwilling to
remedy.
Historically, China has impressed the West by the semblance of or-
der and organization reflected in the Chinese bureaucracy. However, be-
hind the facade presented to the foreigner, there always have been other
systems and organizations controlling the society.' China has perfected
the art of presenting order on paper; but reality often bears little resem-
blance to the system the government officially promulgates.
The dichotomy between China's political theory and its administra-
tive reality is nowhere more apparent than in the system China has devel-
oped to manage the inflow of foreign reserves into the country. In order
to avoid disturbing the domestic economy, the government developed an
elaborate two-tiered currency system.5 In addition, the government is-
sued a set of Foreign Control Regulations6 which placed restrictions on
the use of foreign exchange. The regulations purported to place the use
of foreign exchange under a "unified national plan."7 In reality, how-
ever, beyond the reaches of the officially promulgated regulations, a
thriving black market for foreign currency, foreign goods, and Foreign
Exchange Certificates ("FECs") has developed, over which the PRC gov-
ernment does not exercise any control.
This Comment will examine the realities of the Chinese interna-
tional financial system by going beyond the theoretical operation of the
Chinese two-tiered banking system. The Comment will focus on the
function of the black market in facilitating international trade by examin-
ing the reasons for the black market's existence and the mechanics of its
operation. It is hypothesized that the Chinese government tolerates the
operation of the black market because it provides the Chinese consumer
with a channel through which to acquire foreign durable goods, without
the Chinese government having to expend foreign reserves to finance the
transaction. Finally, it will be argued that, despite China's current use of
the black market as a means of acquiring many foreign imports, the fu-
4 See E. BALAZS, POLITICAL THEORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE REALITY IN TRADITIONAL
CHINA (1965).
5 See infra note 29.
6 Foreign Exchange Provisions (Dec. 18, 1980). Text cited in E. ASIAN EXEC. REPORTS, Feb.
15, 1981, at 21[hereinafter Foreign Exchange Provisions].
7 Randt, China's Provisional Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, 1 CHINA L. REV. 117, 118
(1981) (quoting Ji Chongwei, Board Member of China's Import-Export Control Commission).
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ture market in China for United States manufacturers and exporters
holds great potential.
II. THE CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM
A. The Structure and Theoretical Operation of the
Banking System
China has orchestrated a dramatic transformation of its banking
system since 1979.8 Following questionable management by the govern-
ment after 1949, the banking situation became even more chaotic during
the ten years of the Cultural Revolution. 9 To remedy many of the
problems caused by the Cultural Revolution, China's plans for industri-
alization called for a reorganization of the banking sector. As a result,
there now are five banks in China: the Bank of China, the People's Bank
of China, the Savings Bank, the People's Agricultural Bank, and the New
Development Bank.10 Each bank has a unique role.
The Bank of China ("BOC"), originally established in the early-
nineteenth century during the Qing dynasty, was reestablished by the
new government in 1949. " The BOC was created as a joint state-private
enterprise and dealt, in part, with foreign exchange.' 2 Before 1979, the
BOC was subordinate to the People's Bank of China. However, in 1979
the Chinese government demonstrated the new emphasis it was putting
on the BOC as part of a new economic policy. The government took the
BOC out of its subordinate position to the People's Bank and placed the
BOC directly under the State Council.13 The BOC is now assured a pow-
erful position in China, due in part to the following official monetary
regulations.
1. The BOC is the only full-service bank allowed for foreign use; other
nations are permitted only representative offices.
2. Any group doing business in China must have an account with the
BOC.
3. Any individual or enterprise, whether PRC or foreign, wanting foreign
8 Russell, Bank Issues Currency, Sets Rates, Administers Planning International Banking Han-
dled by Ministry of Finance Through Three Banks, AM. BANK., Dec. 21, 1982, at 8.
9 Id. During the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, banking activities were
dismissed as bourgeois. The Ministry of Finance merged with the People's Bank, and the bank
effectively became the Ministry's cashier. Funds were distributed arbitrarily and used irrationally.
Many recipient enterprises did not have to pay interest or repay their loans. Id.
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exchange must apply for it through the BOC. (The majority of private for-
eign exchange was, by law, previously sold to the BOC.)
4. The above regulations apply also to financial activity in the special eco-
nomic zones ("SEZs"). In addition, all salaries and profits of non-PRC
groups involved in the SEZs must be remitted through the BOC.
14
Of the five banks, the People's Bank serves primarily as a central
bank.' 5 It issues currency, sets interest rates, and administers income
and spending of the national treasury among other functions. The Sav-
ings Bank handles individual deposits and remittances.' 6 The People's
Agricultural Bank serves agricultural projects and unions. 7 The Devel-
opment Bank, funded by a World Bank loan of $70 million, is being set
up to finance the modernization of the Chinese infrastructure in telecom-
munications and transportation.' 8 Of these five banks, however, the
BOC clearly plays the most influential role in China's system of interna-
tional banking.
B. The Role of Foreign Exchange
The Chinese government established the BOC's central role in its
international banking system under China's Provisional Foreign Ex-
change Control Regulations ("Regulations").' 9 Published December 18,
1980, and put into effect March 1, 1981, these Regulations consist of
seven chapters and thirty-four articles. As stated in Article I of the Reg-
ulations, their purpose is to strengthen exchange controls, to increase na-
tional foreign exchange income, and to economize on foreign exchange
expenditures "so as to expedite the national economic growth and safe-
guard the rights and interests of the country. "20
The Regulations distinguish between four categories of domestic
economic entities: 1) Chinese domestic entities; 2) individuals; 3) foreign
organizations resident in China and their personnel; and 4) enterprises
employing overseas Chinese capital or foreign capital or taking the form
of Chinese-foreign joint ventures and the personnel of such enterprises. 2'
According to Article 4 of the Regulations, general procedure requires all
entities in the PRC to surrender their foreign currency to the BOC. Arti-
cle 4 states that:
All Chinese and foreign organizations and individuals in the People's Re-
14 Id.
15 Russell, supra note 8, at 8.
16 Balancing Accounts, supra note 10.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Foreign Exchange Provisions, supra note 6, art. 3.
20 Foreign Exchange Provisions, supra note 6, art. 1.
21 Randt, supra note 7, at 118.
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public of China must, unless otherwise stipulated by law or decree or in
these regulations, sell their foreign exchange proceeds to the Bank of China.
Any foreign exchange required is to be sold to them by the Bank of China
in accordance with the quota approved by the state or with relevant regula-
tions. The circulation, use, and mortgage of foreign currency in the People's
Republic of China are prohibited. Unauthorized sales and purchases of for-
eign exchange and unlawful seizure of foreign exchange in whatever ways
and by whatever means are also prohibited. 2
Thus, the holding of foreign reserves by entities other than the Bank of
China within the PRC is illegal, unless approved by the state.
The enforcement sanctions regarding the holding of foreign cur-
rency are outlined in Article 31 of the Regulations. This Article states
that: "According to the seriousness of the offense, the penalties may take
the form of compulsory exchange of the foreign currency for renminbi,
23
or fine or confiscation of the properties, or both, or punishment by judi-
cial authorities according to law.' 24 More recently, however, on April 5,
1985, the State Administration of Exchange Control announced the Pe-
nal Provisions for Violation of Exchange Control Regulations.25 These
penal provisions were formulated to implement Article 31 of the Provi-
sional Regulations. 6
In addition to establishing specific penalties for those not abiding by
the exchange control provisions, the penal provisions also list specific il-
legal economic activities offensive to the national plans of financial stabil-
ity.2 7 Among the activities addressed, the list includes the utilization of
foreign currency as a medium of exchange and the buying and selling of
foreign exchange for speculative purposes.2 s The penal provisions also
establish leniency for minor offenders who confess and "show sincere
repentence. ' '29 The authority of the Administration of Exchange Control
to distinguish between minor and serious offenders appears to indicate an
official recognition that exchange control violations are common and vio-
lators are many.
Perhaps more significant than the promulgation of the Foreign Ex-
22 Foreign Exchange Provisions, supra note 6, art. 4.
23 Renminbi, literally "people's money," is the form of domestic exchange within China. The
largest denomination in Chinese currency is the yuan, which currently is worth about 2.79 renminbi
to US$1.00. See Bennett, As Peking Wrestles With Devaluation, Currency Market Dealers Thrive,
Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1984, at 32, col. 1.
24 Foreign Exchange Provisions, supra note 6, art. 31.
25 Penal Provisions for Violation of Exchange Control Regulations (Apr. 5, 1985). Text cited in
24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 804-05 (1985).
26 Id., art. 1.
27 Id., art. 6.
28 Id.
29 Id., art. 9.
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change Control Regulations on foreign exchange transactions, China es-
tablished the requirement that foreigners within the PRC use a special
scrip. Known as Foreign Exchange Certificates ("FECs"), China intro-
duced the scrip in 1980 in an attempt to curb foreign currency specula-
tion and black market trading.30 A second purpose of the scrip was to
prevent foreign merchandise from flooding the domestic market and in-
creasing national foreign exchange holdings. 3' This action implemented
a state council decision to ban the circulation of foreign currency within
China.32 FECs are required for the payment of all government services,
(e.g., planes and trains), meals and lodging in luxury hotels, and the
purchase of merchandise in "Friendship" stores.33 (Friendship stores
supply resident tourists with foreign and local goods and only will accept
foreign exchange and FECs for purchases.) 34 Nonetheless, instead of
eliminating the black market for foreign currency, the addition of FECs
has resulted in a thriving black market,35 as the scrip may be used to
purchase imported televisions, recorders, and refrigerators from the
Friendship stores and from other stores selling foreign goods.
Another reason the government introduced FECs was to facilitate
the renminbi's entrance into the international market without disrupting
the domestic economy.36 Until 1984, the renminbi was overvalued.37 At
that time the government discovered that, at the official exchange rate of
approximately 1.5 yuan to the United States dollar, China's inefficient
factories could not compete internationally.38 Consequently, the Chinese
government "effected a defacto devaluation" of the renminbi by creating
a two-tiered exchange rate system. 39 A new rate was established at 2.8
renminbi to the United States dollar as the official exchange; this rate was
to be used by all Chinese entities engaged in foreign trade.' However,
tourists to China still exchanged currency at the official rate of 1.5
renminbi to the United States dollar.4 ' This scheme enabled the domes-
tic exchange rate to remain unchanged while allowing the renminbi to
30 See Randt, supra note 7, at 129.
31 See also Bennett, supra note 23, and Baker, China's Growing Black Market, Fin. Times, Dec.
28, 1984, at 206.
32 Randt, supra note 7, at 129-30 (citing Kramer, China Will Soon Prohibit Use of Foreign Cur-
rencies in Bid to Stop Circulation, Asian Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1980).
33 See Baker, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 See Randt, supra note 7, at 130.
36 Bennett, supra note 23.
37 Id.
38 Id.





compete on the international market. Furthermore, this two-tiered sys-
tem served to encourage exports and to discourage imports.42
III. THE BLACK MARKET: THE REAL SUPPLIER OF FOREIGN
GOODS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
A. Development of the Black Market
The black market for foreign goods, foreign currency, and FECs is
thriving in China. The sudden appearance of the black market stems
from the rapid growth of the Chinese economy recently and its sudden
entrance into the world market after three decades of relative isolation.43
Since 1979, economic reform policies have more than doubled personal
income for the average Chinese.' In the 1984 figures reported, the PRC
government claimed the biggest one-year increase in living standards
since 1949. 4' According to a report given at the National People's Con-
gress, per capita income jumped 12.5% in the cities - to $216 - and
14.7% in rural areas - to $126.46 In addition, the 1981-1985 five-year
plan surpassed its set goals one year ahead of schedule.47
This new prosperity in China has spawned increasing consumer de-
mands, primarily from newly prosperous farmers, urban traders, and
skilled workers.48 Although the government has imported some con-
sumer durables - primarily Japanese color televisions, washing ma-
chines, and refrigerators49 - the official statistical bureau of the PRC
acknowledged that workers making more money have had trouble find-
ing consumer goods to purchase.5" Thus, the black market helps to sup-
ply some of the foreign goods which the new Chinese consumer is unable
to obtain through other channels. Items reportedly obtainable through
the black market include household appliances, color televisions, fashion-
able clothes, imported liquor and cigarettes, cassette players, and
watches.5
As discussed above, FECs are required to purchase foreign durables
42 Id.
43 See Bennett, supra note 23, and Baker, supra note 31.
44 See Baker, supra note 31.
45 See Burns, Some Take Liberties in China's Free Market, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1985, at D4,
col. 3.
46 Id. There is no indication that these increases were adjusted for inflation.
47 Id.
48 See Baker, supra note 31.
49 Burns, supra note 45. Foreign imports of consumer goods to China have increased substan-
tially since 1979, when the only goods imported were Coca-Cola and Schenleys'. Clarke, Commer-
cial Implication of Normalization, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 93, 96 (1979-80).
50 N.Y. Times, July 27, 1984, at D2, col. 4.
51 See Baker, supra note 31.
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from Friendship stores. Formally, only foreigners had access to the for-
eign goods in these stores. As recently as the summer of 1984, however,
some cities such as Harbin permitted Chinese citizens with FECs to
purchase foreign goods in Friendship stores. In Shanghai, "Overseas
Chinese" stores sold foreign goods to anyone who came armed with
scrip.
Some Chinese citizens purchase foreign currency with the intent of
profiting on currency speculation. 2 Many Chinese look to invest in for-
eign currency as they believe it to be more stable and reliable than the
renminbi1 3 Apparently, in its meager attempt to control the growing
black market, the Chinese government may have fueled a bigger market.
As mentioned previously, the government revalued the official exchange
rate in 1984, devaluing the Chinese currency against foreign currencies.
The government devalued the currency and phased out the two-tiered
currency system in hopes of discouraging black market deals."4 Devalua-
tion, however, is historically a sign of instability." Fear that the
renminbi may not be stable in comparison with foreign currencies may be
prompting some Chinese to seek foreign currency as a means to hold
their savings. 6
For a five-month period, between November 1984 and March 1985,
factory managers also joined in the scramble for available foreign ex-
change." Economic liberalizations gave factory managers more in-
dependent authority to purchase goods from abroad. 8 But due in part to
corruption among some local officials, the government announced plans
to tighten bureaucratic controls to prevent such abuse.5 9 China presently
plans to reimpose some state control over the purchase of foreign goods;
52 This author has been told that, historically, the Chinese have not placed much confidence in
the ability of the Chinese currency to maintain its value. As China was often plagued with famines
and political upheavals, which sometimes required a move of the capital city, the Chinese valued
pure gold and pure gold jewelry because it maintained its value and could be transported easily. It
has been suggested that the United States dollar has become a substitute for pure gold. But see infra
note 61.
53 Interview with Henry Yang, Advisor for Chinese Foreign Trade at Mayer, Brown, and Platt,
Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 29, 1985)[hereinafter Yang interview].
54 See Bennett, supra note 23.
55 Id.
56 The Communist government is hesitant to devalue the renminbi. Hyperinflation contributed
to the fall of the Nationalist government in the 1940s. As one fifty-year-old recalled, "[y]our money
would be worth $40 in the morning, and $5 in the afternoon." Bennett, supra note 23. Thus, the
present government is particularly sensitive to the possibility of inflation.
57 Burns, China Reimposing Curbs it Relaxed 5 Months Ago, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A6,
col. 1.
58 See Bennett, supra note 23.
59 See Burns. supra note 57. See also infra note 76.
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consequently, the participation of managers and local officials in the
black market may have stopped.
Finally, the recent surge in the number of students, academicians,
business exchange groups, and government servants who are afforded at
least temporary permits to live or travel abroad account for some of the
demand for foreign currency.6" The Chinese government restricts the
Chinese citizen to a maximum of $75 worth of renminbi when exiting the
country. Thus, the Chinese citizen is forced to supplement this amount
with foreign currencies.61
B. The Mechanics of Black Market Operation
In the last few years, the Chinese government has eased travel re-
strictions for those who wish to travel through China. Tourists now are
permitted to travel independently to areas formerly restricted to officially
sponsored tour groups. Travelling through the PRC in the summer of
1984, the author was curious as to whether she would be given the op-
portunity to observe or engage in an illegal exchange of foreign currency.
"Young shoestring tourists" supply much of the foreign currency avail-
able on the black market because they stay in cheap hotels and eat at
ordinary restaurants where FECs are not required. Such tourists can
finance much of their travels through money changing. 62 Fellow travel-
ers had described the money changing transaction to the author in detail,
so that she felt fairly confident that she would know where to go and
whom to approach in order to change money. To the author's surprise,
the opportunities to observe exchanges on the black market were abun-
dant. In fact, no sooner had the author entered the country than did
someone in Guangzhou approach the author desiring to acquire United
States dollars, Hong Kong dollars, and FECs.
The most conspicuous market for trading appears to be in the
PRC's capital city of Beijing. Trading is also evident in the southern
cities of Guilin and Guangzhou and in the southwestern city of Xian. To
exchange money in Beijing, one need only go in front of the Peking Ho-
60 In recently released figures, 25,961 immigrants were admitted to the United States in 1983.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, (AMERICAN STA-
TISTICAL INDEX (1985)).
61 It also appears that gold is used by Chinese who are attempting to skirt the restrictions placed
on the amount of renminbi which may be carried out of China. Article 27 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulations generally prohibits precious metals from being carried out of China but, of the two
restricted items, gold is easier to transport. In a recent article in the Los Angeles Times, an overseas
Chinese woman was quoted as saying, "[pleople were asking me about the price of gold. They said
they were buying gold to get it out of the country and help pay for their children's education."
Mann, Canton Goes Own Way as China's New Boom Town, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, at 14.
62 See Baker, supra note 31.
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tel, which serves both as a large tourist hotel and a business center for
many of the foreign offices located in China. One sees many street-wise
characters, both of Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese extraction, mean-
dering around the street comer in front of the hotel. The money changer
will glance at the tourist in a knowing way, or discreetly will say,
"Change money!" If the tourist nods knowingly back, the money
changer will begin to follow quietly and discreetly. After a minute or
two, the money changer will overtake and lead the tourist into an incon-
spicuous alley or backstreet.
Once away from the main thoroughfare, the current foreign cur-
rency exchange rate will be quoted and the tourist must indicate how
much foreign currency the tourist is interested in exchanging. The Chi-
nese money changer will walk away and count out the appropriate
amount of money from the supply being carried in a satchel. Within
minutes, the money changer returns with the money carefully counted
and neatly bundled. Should the tourist wish to count the money, the
money changer will wait patiently. Upon completing the exchange the
Chinese money changer quickly vanishes, only to appear moments later
occupying a former spot in front of the Peking Hotel, awaiting another
deal.63
There are four primary methods to acquire and funnel foreign cur-
rency and FECs into the black market. These methods include straight
currency swaps (described above), special exchanges, grey market acqui-
sitions, and foreign remittances. The market for foreign currency and
FECs in a straight currency swap is very competitive. In the summer of
1984, when China was full of young tourists, one could only exchange
FECs for renminbi at a rate of 1:1.3. In the winter however, when tour-
ism is down, the foreigner can double the currency exchanged.' Chinese
will ordinarily offer exchange rates of up to 3:1 in order to obtain
FECs.65
Foreign exchange and FECs also enter the black market through
special trades. In this transaction, money changers offer merchandise for
a certain price in renminbi, or for nothing if the foreigner agrees to make
a currency swap.66 In the summer of 1982, foreigners reportedly were
able to acquire "new, full-length padded coat[s] of export quality" free,
63 In June 1984, this author changed money three times within a two-week period with various
money changers in Beijing. All transactions followed the same procedure. Discussions with more
recent visitors to the PRC have indicated that the procedure remains the same.





by exchanging 100 yuan in FECs for 100 yuan in renminbi.67 The author
observed a similar transaction in Xian involving a two-tiered price sys-
tem directed at foreigners. Articles could be purchased at one price in
renminbi and at a much cheaper price in FECs. In addition, vendors
tended to be much more generous and anxious to bargain with foreigners
willing to spend FECs.
The grey market acquisition of FECs involves the common street
vendor and merchant, not the professional money changer. Here, the
vendor sells goods to foreigners who pay with FECs, then gives the for-
eigners change in renminbi.68 It is apparent that government regulation
of such transactions in small, privately-owned shops is unworkable.
However, even in government-owned shops, other than Friendship
stores, the author observed clerks accepting FECs from foreign custom-
ers and then exchanging FECs with their own remninbi before depositing
the money into the register.
The fourth way in which foreign currency is acquired and funneled
into the black market is through foreign remittances. Particularly in the
last several years, the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese to
write to overseas relatives soliciting money and goods. Previously these
remittances had to be deposited in state bank accounts and withdrawals
could be made only in renminbi.69 Recently, however, China has eased
restrictions on the possession of foreign currency by Chinese residents in
certain provinces who receive these remittances.70 According to the
Jingfi Ribao (China Economic Daily), persons receiving foreign remit-
tances will now be able, for the first time, to withdraw the foreign ex-
change from the bank.71 Reportedly, the relaxation soon will be
nationwide.72
Persons who change money on the black market are a diverse lot.
Among foreigners, young tourists are the main contributors of foreign
exchange and FECs. Among the Chinese, however, the participants are
more varied. In Beijing the most predominant and conspicuous money
changers were the Uighurs, a Chinese minority of Turkish extraction
who originate from Inner Mongolia. Other common money changers in-
clude those whose professions require them to have contact with foreign-
ers, particularly taxi drivers73 and train station attendants.74 Those who
67 Id.
68 Id.




73 See Bennett, supra note 23.
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work in SEZs also have access to foreign exchange and FECs.7 5
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF THE
BLACK MARKET
A. Nonenforcement of Currency Regulations
Apart from the promulgation of the penal provisions for violations
of the Exchange Control Regulations, the Chinese government has made
no real effort to eliminate or control the black market. There have been
no reports of any action taken against either Chinese or foreigners who
exchange money. There have been a few recent reports of criminal ac-
tion against Chinese who have attempted to participate in the black mar-
ket for foreign goods, however these incidents involved serious schemes
of racketeering and embezzlement.76
While not openly promoting the black market, the Chinese govern-
ment tacitly accepts and tolerates its existence. In Beijing, a policeman
turned a blind eye and continued walking as two money changers quar-
reled over who saw the author first and thus who had priority to change
money. Some street vendors brazenly accost visitors, crying "Change
money! Change money!," 77 even chanting it at passing foreigners' cars.78
In Guangzhou, one reporter saw youths bearing hand-lettered cards an-
74 See Mann, supra note 61, at 14.
75 The government established four Special Economic Zones ("SEZs") in 1979 and added Hal-
nan Island in 1983 as special areas to attract foreign investment and encourage export trade, while
concentrating and isolating these foreign influences. See Guo-cang Huan, The SEZs: Problems, Suc-
cesses, Outlooks - I, E. ASIAN EXEC. REPORTS, May 15, 1985, at 11. Unfortunately, these zones
have not performed as well as expected. See The Second Revolution, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 42, 45.
76 In one story reported recently, a minor Chinese official named Liu Bauqin told villagers that
he could import 200,000 Japanese television sets through contacts in Hong Kong. Liu sketched a
deal to fellow officials under which the television sets would be imported and resold for a profit of 30
million yuan, or about $10.7 million. Evidently, the whole deal was a fraud. After taking 12.6
million yuan in advance payments for the nonexistent sets, he placed two million yuan in his own
bank account. He was arrested in a luxury hotel in Shenzhen, across the border from Hong Kong.
He and his fellow swindlers are awaiting trial on charges that carry a maximum death penalty.
Burns, Proletarian 'Rectitude'Runs Amok under China's New Economic Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1985, at 2, col. 1.
In another story reported by China's news agency, Hainan's top officials engaged in a major
fourteen-month embezzlement scheme. Taking advantage of Hainan's tax and duty exemptions,
which were instituted to help industrialize the impoverished island and to promote investment, local
officials began importing luxury goods. These goods could be resold for more than 300% of the
original import price, all at the government's expense, to China's inland provinces. The scandal
involved $1.5 billion, in which 89,000 cars and light trucks, nearly 2,900,000 color television sets,
more than 250,000 videotape recorders, 122,000 motorcycles, cosmetics, food, and toys were im-
ported for resale. See Burns, Scandal Blights Hainan Hope, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at 41, col. 1.
See also The Second Revolution, supra note 75.
77 Bennett, supra note 23.
78 Baker, supra note 31.
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nouncing the day's unofficial exchange rate.79 The relative openness of
the exchange transactions and the lack of enforcement of the penal provi-
sions suggest that the government does not seek to eliminate the market.
Its existence appears to be an accepted reality by the state, in which the
government offers token accolades to those who refrain from black mar-
ket trading, rather than criticizing those who engage in such transac-
tions.Y0 In addition, by relaxing restrictions on Chinese citizens'
acquisition of remittances, the government is essentially sanctioning the
flow of more foreign exchange into the black market.
B. Government Permissiveness
It is questionable why the government promulgates rules against
participation in the black market, refuses to enforce such rules, and even
condones the market's existence. It is submitted that this apparent para-
dox is part of the Chinese political tradition which involved a great di-
chotomy between political theory and administrative reality.
Traditionally, to demonstrate the order and control it envisions, the gov-
ernment often formulates laws based upon theories it cannot or will not
apply. It sometimes appears that the government believes order has been
attained merely by passing the proper legislation. Instead, societal order
is achieved in ways contrary to the officially-sanctioned system. In this
manner, the black market has replaced much of China's officially-sanc-
tioned financial and goods markets.
In addition to this systemic paradox rooted in China's political tra-
dition, the government permits the continuance of the black market be-
cause of the benefits realized by its continued existence. The black
market provides a means by which Chinese consumers may acquire
FECs and foreign goods without the need for the Chinese government to
spend its foreign exchange reserves importing these items. Stockpiling
foreign reserves is fundamental to China's spending policy. Since 1979,
China has maintained a very conservative policy regarding foreign trade
expenditures. As of 1983, China held the seventh largest gold and for-
eign exchange reserves in the world.8" China's reserves stood at a record
79 Bennett, supra note 23.
80 The Peking Daily reported the story of a chief of the dining car crew on a train named He
Baoxien. The story said that, despite suggestions by his friends and co-workers that he was being
foolish, he repeatedly refused to trade his renminbi for FECs, to which he had special access on the
train. "'I don't want anything except more foreign exchange for the state,' he said." Mann, supra
note 61, at 14.
81 Those countries which list more reserves are: the United States, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Japan. Cass, More Flesh on Skeleton of Change, Fin. Times,
Oct. 29, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
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high $16.67 billion in September 1984, after rising rapidly from $226 mil-
lion in 1980.82 Despite its large reserves, the government's economic pol-
icy prohibits a large amount of foreign exchange to be used to import
foreign consumer goods.1
3
The characterization of China's policies as "one step backward for
each step forward"84 is particularly appropriate in describing its spend-
ing policy for foreign exchange reserves. Following a nearly disastrous
spending spree in 1978, China displayed, for several years, the utmost
frugality in its spending habits. Then in May and June 1984, China be-
gan reporting its intention to spend more of its foreign reserves. 85 For
nearly one year, China loosened its control over foreign reserves and in-
creased imports. 86  In addition to the imports needed for multibillion-
dollar projects including nuclear power plants, coal and oil develop-
ments, and transportation and communications networks (projects in
which the government plans to invest over the next several years),87
China began to increase its imports of consumer durables. Leading the
import surge were color television sets, radio-recorders, washing ma-
chines, and refrigerators in amounts double those of the previous quar-
ter.8 8 In March 1985, the government explained the increase of these
imports as a means of easing shortages and "mop[ping] up currency. "89
By July 1985, however, Beijing voiced its concern over dwindling
foreign reserves9" and called for measures to halt the decline. Programs
were implemented to decrease imports, particularly those deemed unnec-
essary (such as consumer goods and automobiles), and to cut back on
82 Wall St. J., July 9, 1985, at 33, col. 6.
83 Cass, supra note 81.
84 See Ching, supra note 2.
85 In May 1984, when China's foreign exchange holdings stood at $15.69 billion, Dai Qiading,
general manager of the Institute of International Finance under the government's Bank of China,
told a Chinese seminar, "such a large reserve isn't necessary for China." He then recommended
spending $5 to $6 billion. In addition, at the National People's Congress in May 1984, Planning
Minister Song Ping promised "greater access to foreign exchange in China's coastal foreign invest-
ment zones." China was reportedly striving to increase imports. Bennett, China's Cash Hoard Sym-
bolizes Its Problems, Wall St. J., July 12, 1984, at 41, col. 2.
86 In a report issued by the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry, imports jumped 54% from the year
earlier, resulting in a reported $890 million trade deficit for the first quarter. In contrast is the $1.09
billion trade surplus in the first quarter of 1984. Imports reached $6.04 billion while exports,
although 2.7% more than the year previous, only totaled $5.15 billion. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1985, at
34, col. 3 [hereinafter Trade Report].
87 Bennett, supra note 85.
88 See Trade Report, supra note 86 (quoting China's Foreign Trade Ministry).
89 Burns, supra note 45.




trade exhibitions overseas.91 China's current conservative fiscal policy is,
in part, a reaction to the country's harrowing financial experience in
1978.92 In an enthusiastic attempt to industrialize, Chinese planners
overextended the country's financial resources by purchasing entire fac-
tories from Japan, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many.93 Such rapid spending resulted in soaring interest rates of up to
18% on billions of dollars in debt.94 The government eventually can-
celled many contracts in an attempt to limit its financial liability. The
current Chinese approach to industrialization is much more cautious and
frugal; for example, the government now purchases limited amounts of
imported technology as opposed to ordering complete industrial com-
plexes.95 Not surprisingly, consumer goods rank last on the govern-
ment's list of import priorities.
Although China occasionally indulges in the importation of con-
sumer goods, the government quickly reverts to conservative fiscal poli-
cies at the first sign that foreign exchange reserves are being affected
seriously. Some provinces have already taken measures following Bei-
jing's announcement of tighter controls. These measures include more
carefully monitoring the importation of capital goods, approving only
those imports which will clearly raise output, and limiting some projects
with foreign participation which could cost the country foreign
exchange.
96
As reflected in recent events, the Chinese government wants to
maintain a positive flow of foreign exchange into the country. To accom-
plish this goal, the government will continue to emphasize exports over
imports. Of those items which are imported, China will continue to
place the greatest priority on expenditures for large-scale investment
projects to build up its infrastructure. In China's import scheme, con-
sumer goods are an afterthought. 97
91 Id.




96 Wall St. J., May 24, 1985, at 28, col. 5.
97 The leading United States exports to China include logs and lumber, fertilizers, synthetic
resins and rubber, coal-cutting machinery, mining and well-drilling machinery, commercial aircraft,
office machinery, computers, and scientific instruments. Unclassified State Department Release on
United States China Trade, No. 377-3583 (Sept. 5, 1985).
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLACK MARKET ON
UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE
Despite rhetoric that Beijing intends to use some of its foreign
reserves to import more goods, there remains a clear emphasis to import
materials for long-range and large-scale construction projects rather than
luxury items. In addition, it appears that Beijing would like to amass
large amounts of foreign reserves and that it will act to restrict capital
outflow when reserves are being affected seriously. Such restrictive meas-
ures include eliminating consumer imports.
Currently, however, Chairman Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese gov-
ernment are extolling the new prosperity and increased consumerism
which are products of the successful economic liberalization plans. In-
deed, The People's Daily, the Communist Party newspaper, has written
that "getting rich and buying consumer goods is not decadent - espe-
cially if it makes life more pleasant."9 8 Hence, China's internal economic
conflict exists because the successful economic policies pursued by the
government have created new consumer demand by the Chinese citi-
zenry, but the government is unwilling to commit sufficient foreign
reserves for the importation of consumer items to satisfy the demand.
The black market for foreign goods and foreign currency provides a
means by which the private Chinese citizen may acquire consumer
durables while permitting the government to continue its emphasis on
the purchase of goods for large construction projects. Thus, whether
gifts sent by Chinese friends or relatives overseas supply the black mar-
ket, or whether foreign currency is acquired through the black market
and subsequently used to purchase foreign goods in Hong Kong, the Chi-
nese government can applaud increased consumerism without financing
it. In addition, by encouraging its citizens to solicit foreign goods and
foreign currency from abroad and by easing restrictions on the holding of
foreign currency, the Chinese government is fanning the flames of the
black market, not stamping out the fire.
The most common way for Chinese to purchase foreign goods is
through the use of FECs at Friendship stores and Overseas Chinese
stores. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the black market for FECs is
the most active of the black markets. Financing imports in this manner
permits the domestic economy and the balance of payments to remain
relatively unaffected. By requiring FECs backed by foreign currency for
the purchase of foreign goods, the government is assured of receiving an
adequate amount of foreign funds to pay for the imports. Moreover, the
98 The Second Revolution, supra note 75, at 42.
Chinese Black Market
7:833(1986)
government knows that it will not have to purchase foreign currency
elsewhere or draw upon its foreign reserves to settle a balance of pay-
ments. Finally, selling foreign goods for FECs augments the govern-
ment's foreign exchange holdings. The government includes a hefty
profit in the price of the foreign goods it sells, thereby acquiring all the
foreign exchange exceeding the import price.
With respect to FECs and the goods which they purchase, the gov-
ernment has taken a practical, if not expedient, approach to this market
transaction. As a Chinese man whom the author interviewed stated,
"Once the government has acquired your dollar, it is not so concerned
about who spends the FECs." The tourist who initially exchanges for-
eign currency for FECs and then exchanges FECs for renminbi still has
deposited foreign exchange into China's foreign exchange reserves.'°°
Moreover, the government places no prohibitions on the acquisition or
possession of FECs by Chinese and also permits Chinese to use the scrip.
Such a political posture may be interpreted as tacit approval of the black
market for FECs.
Reflected in its past policy and recent events, the PRC is not em-
barking on an expansive plan to import foreign goods. For the forseeable
future, the black market will remain China's stop-gap measure for pro-
viding consumer goods to its citizens without affecting its foreign
reserves. As the bulk of United States exports to China have been mater-
ials for development projects, China's recent import restrictions have had
minimal impact on United States-China trade.10 Judging from China's
recent action, the United States exporter should realize that, while
China's market for goods such as lumber and machinery remains stable,
its current import market for consumer goods is limited.
VI. CONCLUSION
The business executive wishing to break into the Chinese market
should be advised to proceed with limited expectations for the present
99 Yang Interview, supra note 53.
100 Foreign tourists must spend renminbi within the country as it cannot be taken out of China
legally. Foreign Exchange Provisions, supra note 6, art. 30. Generally, only Chinese customs offi-
cials will convert FECs back into foreign currency. However, they are reticent to convert large
quantities of renminbi back into foreign exchange.
101 In 1984, Japan controlled 26% of China's nearly $50 billion of international trade while the
United States only accounted for 12% of this trade. Japan, however, has suffered more because of
China's recent import cutbacks as China generally imports consumer goods from Japan. As one
United States business official observed, because the United States provides China with equipment
and materials used for China's development, "It's easy for China to cut back on Japanese products,
but less easy for them to do without the American products." Kramer, Japanese Dominate Market
with Savvy Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1985, at I, col. 1.
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and to maintain a sense of optimism for the future. There is great poten-
tial for a healthy consumer market in China as evidenced by its stable
banking structure and its rapidly growing gross national product and
consumer demand. Currently, however, as a result of a conservative fis-
cal policy and the desire to avoid depleting foreign currency reserves, the
government has limited its imports of foreign goods.
The black market has evolved as a mechanism for Chinese consum-
ers to acquire much of their foreign durables. The government sees the
practical benefits in permitting the continued functioning of the black
market. While the black market is in direct conflict with most of the
currency and import regulations the government promulgates, the gov-
ernment also realizes that the black market can supply the Chinese con-
sumer with demanded goods without the government financing such
import transactions. Consequently, United States exporters should not
expect large contracts for consumer goods in the near future; such needs
will continue to be satisfied through the unofficial channels of the black
market.
While cutbacks and limitations on the importation of consumer
durables have dampened the prospects of increased foreign sales for
many United States manufacturers, the effects on United States trade
have been relatively minor. Most United States exports to China have
consisted of industrial rather than consumer goods. Hence, the black
market has affected United States export trade far less than the trade of
countries exporting consumer goods to the PRC.
Regarding future trading opportunities with China, the United
States manufacturer may look to two scenarios. First, trade restrictions
eventually will be eased which will allow easier entry into the Chinese
consumer market. Second, exporters might consider a joint venture with
China if they wish to embark on long-range manufacturing projects. It
must be recognized that there are many regulations and restrictions im-
posed upon such ventures. If sufficient capital is involved, however, the
joint venture project has the advantage of circumventing China's import
restrictions and possibly providing a means of reaching the Chinese con-
sumer. The outlook for the future of United States-China trade is far
from grim. Considering China's growth record in the past five years,
China should provide a vast and demanding consumer market in the not-
too-distant future.
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